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US Corporate Default Swap Valuation: The Market liquidity hypothesis and  
Autonomous Credit Risk 
 
 
1. Introduction to CDS Valuation
 
Market liquidity has become central to debt markets over the last ten years, as 
evidenced by the number of innovative credit products that have been introduced to 
increase the depth and breadth of credit markets. This phenomenon has led to the 
exponential growth of credit derivatives, one of the most successful financial 
innovative products of the past decade. The British Bankers Association estimates 
that the credit derivative market grew from a notional $180 billion in 1997 to $5.0 
trillion in 2004 and is expected to reach upwards of $8.2 trillion in 20062. A review 
of the credit markets has shown that while overall quality of global credit has 
deteriorated the volume of corporate bonds (corporate credit risk) has risen 
dramatically over the past few years. 
The growing importance of the corporate debt component of the overall 
global debt market (relative to government debt) indicates a growth in global credit 
risk, which in itself partly explains the observed exponential growth in the use of 
credit default swaps to mitigate this growing counterparty risk. Much of this growth 
in counter-party risk stems from the ever increasing demand by banks, insurance 
companies, institutional investors and hedge funds seeking credit risk insurance to 
cover risky long bond exposures. As far back as November 2002, then Fed Chief 
Alan Greenspan appearing before the Foreign Relations Committee suggested that 
                                                 
2 In an August 31st 2006 Wall Street Journal article “Can Anyone Police the Swaps” the current CDS market was 
estimated at upwards of $17 trillion. 
  
 
3
 one positive outcome of this growth is the strengthening of the financial sector by 
spreading credit risk more broadly across the entire sector as against having it all 
concentrated among a few participants.  
The abundance of current financial literature on credit default swap3 
valuation ignores the possible role of market liquidity as a parameter in valuing 
credit default swaps (credit risks). Empirical work by Fleming (2003) shows that 
bond market liquidity can be a barometer of market conditions, which can signal the 
willingness of market makers to commit capital and take on risk. While there is an 
abundance of one or two-factor models that attempt to value these instruments, there 
is a lack of work that factors the impact of market liquidity in the valuation model. 
Chen et al (2004) found that changes in liquidity and credit ratings alone explain 
33% of cross-sectional variations in investment and speculative grade bond spreads. 
Recent work by Tang et al (2006) and Acharya et al (2005) has also concluded that 
there is evidence that liquidity plays a critical role in the CDS market. Given the 
importance of liquidity in bond pricing, it is believed that the introduction of this 
parameter in the credit default swap (CDS) pricing model will help to improve the 
explanatory power of the model and better explain the cross-sectional variation in the 
CDS spreads.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 A credit default swap (CDS) may be described as an insurance contract that provides counter party protection in 
the event of a default by an underlying referenced issuer.  See Das and Hanouna (2006) for a discussion of CDS 
spreads and products. 
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1.1 Approaches to Credit Default Swap Valuation  
 
 Earlier empirical work on valuing credit default swaps (CDS) and other 
contingent claims that are subject to default risks have been modeled using either the 
structural or the reduced model approach. The structural form model views 
contingent claims as options written on the value of an underlying firm’s assets. In so 
doing the model treats the bankruptcy or default process as endogenous by explicitly 
modeling the asset and liability structure of the company. Stochastic processes for 
both the value of assets and liabilities are specified and default is triggered whenever 
the value of assets falls below the value of liabilities. In other words, default 
endogenously occurs when the debt value of the firm exceeds the total value of the 
firm. Duffie and Singleton (1999) also suggest that these models are based on first 
passage of assets to a default boundary. These models have been used by Merton 
(1974), Chance (1990), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Bharath and Shumway 
(2004), Zhang, Zou and Zhu (2005) and Das, Hanouna and Sarin (2006).  
Adaptations of structural models are based on the original framework 
developed by Merton (1974) using the principles of option pricing. In such a 
framework, the default process of a company is driven by the value of the company’s 
assets and the risk of a firm’s default is therefore explicitly linked to the variability in 
the firm’s asset value. The Merton model premises that default occurs when the 
value of a firm’s assets is lower than that of its liabilities. Assuming that the 
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 company’s debt is entirely represented by a zero-coupon bond, if the value of the 
firm at maturity is greater than the face value of the bond, then the bondholder gets 
back the face value of the bond. However, if the value of the firm is less than the 
face value of the bond, the equity holders get nothing and the bondholders get back 
the market value of the firm. The payoff at maturity of the bondholder is therefore 
equivalent to the face value of the bond minus a put option on the value of the firm, 
with a strike price equal to the face value of the bond and a maturity equal to the 
maturity of the bond. Following this basic intuition, Merton derived an explicit 
formula for default risky bonds, which can be used both to estimate the probability of 
default (PD) of a firm and to estimate the yield differential between a risky bond and 
a default-free bond4.  
However, despite improvements over the years to make the original Merton 
framework more robust, the improved structural-form model still suffers from three 
main drawbacks, which represent the main reasons behind their relatively poor 
empirical performance. They still require estimates for the parameters of the firm’s 
asset value, which is non-observable. Also, they cannot incorporate credit rating 
changes that occur quite frequently for default risky corporate debts. Finally, most 
structural form models assume that the value of the firm is continuous in time. As a 
result, the time of default can be predicted just before it happens and thus no surprise 
events occur. 
                                                 
4 In addition to Merton (1974), first generation structural-form models include Black and Cox (1976), Geske 
(1977), and Vasicek (1984). Each of these models tries to refine the original Merton Framework by removing one 
or more of the unrealistic assumptions. Black and Cox (1976) introduces the possibilities of more complex capital 
structures, with subordinate debt; Geske (1977) introduces interest paying debt; Vasicek (1984) introduces the 
distinction between short and long term liabilities, which now represents a distinctive feature of Kamakura 
Corp’s KMV model. 
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 In attempting to overcome the difficulties of implementing and working with 
structural models, researchers introduced reduced form models that use simple 
valuation procedures to produce exceptional results, that compare well to their 
structural counterparts. Reduced form models achieve this feat because they assume 
that default is an unpredictable event following some exogenous unexpected random 
jump process and as such does not require estimates of the value of the firm’s assets 
(see Longstaff et al (2005)). Though recent work by Arora et al (2005) suggests that 
reduced form models do not significantly outperform structural models when 
predicting probability of default and CDS premia, the reduced form model’s ease of 
calibration, simplicity in specification and limited data requirement makes them 
popular. These models include those developed by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), 
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), Duffie, Saita and Wang (2004), Longstaff, 
Mithal and Neis (2005) and Wu and Zang (2005).  
Reduced form models have been extended in different directions over the 
years so as to improve their effectiveness in predicting default and valuing credit 
risk. However, a review of the literature has not revealed an attempt to model the 
effect of market liquidity in the valuation of credit risk. Longstaff, Mithal and Neis 
(2005) used the bond market to extract data which was used to price CDS contracts. 
They found that bond implied CDS premia were higher than market CDS spreads. 
The difference was attributed to liquidity factors and tax effects which do not 
necessarily reflect the default risk of the underlying asset. Blanco, Brennan, and 
Marsh (2005) reported that though they found that implied CDS and bond premia 
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 appeared in line with each other in the long run, CDS spreads tend to respond more 
quickly to changes in credit conditions in the short run. This short run phenomenon 
appears to be a market liquidity condition. In addition, Tang and Yan (2006) found 
from their work on the effects of liquidity in the CDS market that CDS spreads were 
significantly positive with liquidity, which led them to conclude that there is 
significant liquidity effects in the CDS market. 
The purpose of this study is to extend the popular reduced form approach to 
modeling credit risk by including a market liquidity proxy. Observed CDS market 
data tend to suggest that liquidity is directly related to credit quality. So while the 
study will be looking at the direct effects of liquidity in the valuation process, it will 
also be interesting to view the indirect effects of liquidity on autonomous credit risk. 
The proposed methodology for this study builds on the recent literature of credit 
default swap valuation through joint default risk-neutral intensity and recovery rate 
dynamics. The study adopts historical CDS bid-ask spreads as a proxy of market 
liquidity. 
The study’s main innovations are, (a) the effects of liquidity in CDS 
valuation, examining how changing liquidity conditions affect credit risk valuation in 
high frequency data; and (b) evaluating the effects of liquidity on the phenomenon of 
autonomous credit risk. Autonomous credit risk appears to be a positive phenomenon 
that occurs when market risk (short term instantaneous interest rate) is zero and 
markets are fully liquid. Such credit risk is considered autonomous of market risk 
and market liquidity only when the credit spreads or premia does not vary with 
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 changes in market risk and liquidity conditions. An absence of liquidity effects in the 
market should result in an underestimation of the autonomous credit risk. In a 
somewhat similar study Pan and Singleton (2005) found that in the absence of 
liquidity considerations in the CDS market, implied recovery rates were significantly 
lower than generally observed. 
These results should thus compliment past empirical work in better 
estimating credit risk. The study will begin by laying out the proposed model 
structure and components of the model following the two-factor model developed by 
Jarrow et al (2001). In the initial specification of the model the hazard rate is only a 
function of the default-free interest rate. The extended three-factor model5 will 
include a market liquidity proxy. Liquidity spreads are increasingly being viewed as 
a function of the volatility of the firm’s assets and leverage, which are key 
determinants of credit risk. Its effects tend to be most dramatic as it tends to 
disappear when most needed by the market (as demonstrated in some of the more 
recent market downturns) and suddenly re-emerges as markets become bullish. Both 
specifications will be used in the pricing of market traded US corporate credit default 
swap. The estimates of the parameters will be compared across the standard and 
extended forms of the reduced-form two-factor pricing model, across the observed 
dataset, and to the estimates obtained in similar studies to determine the relevance of 
these assumptions to the outcome of the results. 
Economic theory suggests that market and credit risks are intrinsically related 
to each other and inseparable. If the market value of the firm’s assets unexpectedly 
                                                 
5 As discussed in Section 2, the two-factor model is a special case of the three-factor liquidity enhanced model. 
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 changes, generating market risk, this will increase the probability of default thereby 
generating credit risk6. As such, a central hypothesis to a number of reduced form 
models and the one used in this study is the fact that market and credit risks are 
positively related, inseparable and dependent on the macro economy (short term 
interest rates). However these models appear to be missing another important aspect; 
market liquidity considerations, which can be viewed as a function of the volatility 
of the firm’s assets and leverage, a determinant of credit risk that measures the 
willingness of market makers to commit resources to absorb market volume. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 
introduces the theoretical foundations of the model and discusses the methodology 
for credit default swap pricing, giving some overview of current valuation 
methodologies and the analytical procedure for including the liquidity proxy to the 
pricing process. Section 3 gives a brief description of the CDS data and the various 
explanatory variables. Section 4 presents the main empirical findings regarding the 
role of market liquidity in CDS valuation. Section 5 summarizes the finding and 
proposes areas of future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Credit risk is jointly determined by the occurrence of default and the recovered amounts in the event of a 
default. 
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 2. Model Structure 
This section lays out the model structure and the component parts of the model 
following the two-factor reduced form approach developed by Jarrow et al (2001). 
The two-factor model is a special case of the three-factor liquidity enhanced 
specification. When lt = 0 the three-factor model collapses to the Jarrow et al’s 
(2001) two-factor framework. The model assumes that markets are frictionless, 
arbitrage free and characterized by a constant exogenous recovery rate (rt). The 
model further assumes that the US Treasury rate is the default free rate, and that 
default events and recovery rates are correlated and dependent on the macro 
economy.   
 
2.1 The Credit Default Swap Valuation Framework 
The valuation framework is derived from the no arbitrage, reduced form 
credit risk approach. The study considers a pure exchange, frictionless economy with 
a finite horizon [o, τ] for a fixed τ > 0. Trading can be discrete or continuous and 
traded are both defaultable and default-free zero coupon bonds of all maturities. The 
portfolio of bonds serves as the numeraire. The underlying uncertainty in the 
economy is represented by a filtered probability space (Ω, , P), where Ω is the 
state space,  is the σ-algebra representing measurable events, and   is the 
empirical probability measure. Information evolves over the trading interval 
according to the augmented right-continuous complete filtration { : t∈ [0, τ]} 
generated by n ≥ 1 independent Brownian motions {W
F
F P
tF
1(t), W2(t),…,Wn(t): t∈ [0, τ]} 
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 initialized at zero. We let E(• ) denote expectation with respect to the probability 
measure .  P
Given the assumption of no arbitrage and frictionless markets, there exists an 
equivalent martingale measure  (making all the default free and risk zero coupon 
bond prices martingales), defined by the property that the price (P
Q
t) at date t of a 
security promising some contingent amount at time , and paying zero in 
default, is represented as follows 
TFX ∈ tT ≥
    P e
( )
{ }1 |
T
s s
t
r l ds
Q
t T txτ
− +
>
⎢ ⎥∫⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
E F     (1) 
Whereτ denotes the random occurrence of default ( )Tτ < , characterized as follows, 
    { tifotherwisettD ≤≤ == ττ 010}{1      (2) 
rs = ƒ(t, t) is the risk free short rate process and ls  is the available market liquidity 
which anecdotally increases with a deterioration in credit quality. So given equation 
(1), the prevailing spot rate and existing market liquidity the present values of zero 
coupon bonds are computed by discounting and taking expectations with respects 
to Q . 
For purposes of this study it will also be assumed that τ has a risk neutral 
intensity, denoted where gives the approximate probability of default for this 
firm over the time interval [t, t+Δ]. Jarrow (2001) used a two factor reduced form 
model to price credit default swaps under an assumption of a perfectly liquid market, 
however this study will relax this assumption by inputting a measure of liquidity 
Q
tλ ΔQtλ
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 directly into the model. So under the usual Cox process the study assumes that the 
risk neutral intensity process is modeled as ( )ttQt lrt,λ , where ]},0[:{ Ttrt ∈  is a vector 
stochastic process representing the state variable underlying the macro economy and 
 is the liquidity proxy that measures market liquidity. Additionally, 
Jarrow et al (2001) further suggests that an increase in market risk increases the 
likelihood of the issuing firm defaulting on its debt obligation. This study further 
postulates that liquidity decreases with a deterioration of credit quality, hence we 
would expect that low investment grade and high yield grade securities would have 
less liquid markets than high investment grade instruments. This would explain why 
a number of high yield products are illiquid and difficult to trade in debt markets. 
Secondly, the Cox-process assumption, the conditional risk-neutral probability of 
survival to time T is  
]},0[:{ Ttlt ∈
tF
   [ ] ( ){ } { }1 | 1 |
T
Q s ds
Q Q t
t T t tp
λ
τ τ
−
〉 >
∫= = te
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
p E EF F
                                                
   (3) 
Given equations (1) and (3) we can indirectly determine the value of the 
credit default swap analytically from the discounted value of the swap payment 
stream to the protection seller as represented by the following expression of credit 
risky credit protection payments7. 
   
 
7 See Jarrow and Yildirim (2001) for a detailed description of the CDS analytical pricing process. 
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 [ ] [ ]
t t{ } ( )1
S S
u u u u u u
t t
t
T Tr l du r l du
Tt s
t t
P C e ds e ds
λ λ
τ λ
− − + − − +
< =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝
∫ ∫−∫ ∫Q Qt E Et
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎟⎟
  (4) 
 
The protection sellers periodic swap payment receipts in equation (4) continue for a 
fixed period of time [0, T]. This payment by the protection buyer will continue until 
(a) there is a default by the issuer who has the characteristic  hazard function, or 
(b) maturity of the credit default swap contract. In the event that there is no default 
the second part of the expression goes to zero. Following Jarrow and Yildirim 
(2001), this valuation of the swap payments to the default seller is identical to the 
value of a risky coupon bond making continuous coupon payments per unit of time, 
with zero recovery rates, less the cost of credit protection. Given the preceding we 
can manipulate the analytic formulation in (4) to obtain the value of the risky coupon 
bond displayed in equation (5). 
Q
tλ
[ ]
t{ } ( )1 ( , ,: 0)
S
u u u
t
t
T T r l du
t Tt s
t t
P p C v t s ds e ds
λ
τ λ
− − +
< =
⎛ ⎞⎜⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫= −∫ ∫QEt    (5) 
Computationally, this expression satisfies the valuation framework wherein the risk 
neutral default intensity is positively correlated with interest rates but independent of 
market liquidity. Market liquidity is inversely related to credit risk, hence as credit 
quality deteriorates bid-ask spreads will widen. 
At time 0, when Pt = 0, equation 5 above can be rearranged to give the value 
of the swap rate as  
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[ ]
t ( )
0
(0, ,: 0)
S
u u u
t
T r l du
s
t
TTC
e d
v s ds
λλ − − +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝
∫
=
∫
∫
QEt s
⎠      (6) 
 
Analytical computations using expression 6 will yield the market liquidity enhanced 
CDS price. The Jarrow et al’s (2001) CDS valuation expression is a special case of 
the expression in equation 6. When lt = 0 the three-factor liquidity enhanced 
valuation model collapses to the Jarrow et al (2001) two-factor framework. For 
computational ease it is assumed that, for each issuer i ∈p {1, . . .,n} the economy is 
Markov in the state variables – interest rates and market liquidity (credit default 
swap bid-ask prices are used to proxy market liquidity). It is further assumed that 
both  and  follows a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process under , in that  itr
i
tl P
 
      (7) ,[ ] i Pi i i i ipt tPdr r dt dWκ θ σ= − + t
t       (8) 
,[ ] i Pi i i i ipt tPdl r dt dWκ θ σ= − +
Where is a standard Brownian motion under initialized at W,i PtdW P 0 = 0, and 
where iPθ , ipκ ≠ 0, and iσ  > 0 are positive constants8. 
                                                 
8 ipa , iPθ , iσ  are the term structure coefficients. 
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 The dynamics of the default intensity and recovery rate jointly determine the 
dynamics of the CDS spread in the reduce form methodology. Reduced form models 
introduce separate explicit assumptions on the dynamics of both the probability of 
default and recovery rates. An abundance of research has been devoted to default 
intensity dynamics unlike the dynamics of the recovery rate. This maybe partly due 
to the fact that as shown by Houweling and Vorst (2005) the recovery rate has 
negligible effects on the outcome of credit default swap prices. Generally, reduced 
form models assume an exogenous recovery rate that is independent of the 
probability of default. Given the outcome from Houweling and Vorst (2005) the 
methodology assumes a constant recovery rate for the preceding analyses. 
The intensity function is assumed to be linear in the spot rate of interest and 
market liquidity. The hazard function’s evolution is given under the risk neutral 
probability . Shown below as Q
λ(t) = max [λ0(t) + λ1r(t) - λ2l(t) 0]      (9) 
Where : 
(a) λ0 is a deterministic function of time, or the implied autonomous risk 
premia; 
(b)  λ1 and λ2 are constants; 
 
Additionally, it is further assumed that forward rates of all maturities exist and in the 
continuous case may be defined as; 
   ƒ(t, T) ≡ ).,(log Ttp
T∂
∂−                (10) 
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 2.2 Parameter Estimates 
The sample variance, mean reversion parameter and long term mean is computed 
using the smoothed forward rate curves previously generated over the sample period. 
Since we are using cross sectional data, a cubic-spline interpolation procedure is 
used to generate additional data points. 
 
A: Default Parameter Estimates 
Following a popular approach used by the academic literature, the issuer’s 
default intensity can be modeled as following a stochastic Poisson process, 
characterized by jumps in the process. The study’s default parameter estimates were 
obtained by using non-linear OLS to fit the term structures of default swap quotes to 
the estimated arbitrage free spot rate evolution. The non-linear regression procedure 
is implemented using both cross-sectional and time series observations of swap 
premia. 
Given the spot rate parameter estimates of θ, α, and σ from the spot rate 
evolution process and the term structure of the swap prices, λt is inverted, to obtain 
the parameter estimates (using a sums of squared error minimizing procedure). 
 
λ(t) = max [λ0(t) + λ1r(t)  - λ2l(t)  0]                        (11) 
Where λ0(t) ≥ 0 a deterministic function of time “t”, is the implied autonomous risk 
that CDS investors hold when market risk is 0 and markets are fully liquid. λ1 and λ2 
are constants. In this formulation, the (pseudo) probability of default per unit of time 
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 is assumed to be the maximum of a linear function of the spot rate r(t), market 
liquidity and zero. The maximum operator is needed in the expression to ensure that 
the intensity function doesn’t become negative. 
The intercept of the intensity process is a deterministic function that is 
restricted to be a constant. Since this model has only three parameters, there will be 
errors in matching the term structure of default swap quotes.  Hence the parameters 
were chosen to minimize the sum of squared error between the theoretical and 
market quotes. 
 
B: Recovery Rate Estimates 
There are two approaches for the specification of the recovery rate. The first 
is to consider it as just another parameter, and estimate it from the data along with 
the other parameters. The second method is to a priori fix a value. A number of 
researchers in the economic literature suggest that although the first method seems 
preferable, it turns out that it is hard to identify the recovery rate from the data, see 
Duffee (1999), Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Houweling and Vorst (2005). This 
may pose a problem for some applications; fortunately this does not affect the 
pricing of credit default swaps. Houweling and Vorst (2005) found that the pricing of 
default swap premium is relatively insensitive to the assumed recovery rate. As such 
this study assumes a constant recovery rate across the observation period.  
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 C: Liquidity Proxy Estimates 
It is generally difficult to measure market liquidity, because liquidity is an elusive 
phenomenon. However a number of recent studies have shown promise using bid-
ask spreads as a proxy for liquidity (see for example Tang and Yan (2006), Acharya 
and Johnson (2005)). Following the popular approach of using bid-ask spreads as a 
measure of liquidity, the study used CDS bid-ask spreads for the CDS instruments 
for the period under study9. To be able to determine liquidity levels for each credit 
grade, the procedure is to calculate the measure of liquidity as the “ask” minus the 
“bid”. The size of the spread from ask to bid prices will differ mainly because of the 
difference in liquidity of each asset. This spread differential is then divided by the 
mid price to derive a unit-less bid-ask measure. This unit-less bid-ask measure forms 
the instantaneous market liquidity proxy of the study. Tang and Yan (2006) 
illustrated that since bid-ask spreads are a measure of information asymmetry in the 
CDS market it would thus be a good liquidity measure. For this study pooled 
estimates were taken across credit classes. Table 3 in section 4 presents the pooled 
bid-ask spreads across credit grades. It can be seen from the table that bid-ask 
spreads increase across credit quality indicating that liquidity decreases with a 
deterioration of credit quality. 
 
                                                 
9 See Tang and Yan (2006) for an elaborate discussion on using bid-ask prices as a liquidity proxy 
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 3. Description of the Data 
 This section provides a description of the data used in this paper. Credit 
default swap bid-ask10 data for the market liquidity proxy estimates were obtained 
from Bloomberg. JP Morgan credit default swap mid price data was used to compute 
pricing estimates and the US Treasury rates were obtained from Bloomberg. 
  The data analyzed is based on weekly observations from January 2nd, 2004 to 
August 08th, 2006, where tt ,...,
365
1= . One observation made during this stage of the 
exercise is the fact that prior to 2002 the CDS market was not as liquid and active as 
it is currently. Hence there is not an abundance of reasonable data prior to 2003. The 
data is comprised of a mixture of 32 US dollar denominated AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB 
and B credit default swaps issued by 32 fortune 500 companies, across several 
industries chosen to stratify the various industry groupings such as cable/media, 
financial, insurance, U.S banks, telecom, energy, retail, technology and 
manufacturing.  The CDS data set was obtained from JP Morgan, a leading market 
maker for credit default swaps, which are spreads over weekly U.S. Treasury quotes. 
Quotations are available only on days when there is some level of liquidity in the 
market as evidenced either through trades or by active market making by a dealer. 
Bloomberg was then used to obtain CDS bid-ask prices, characteristics such as 
maturity dates, coupon percentages and seniorities. Bloomberg was also used to 
obtain weekly U.S Treasury, note and bill prices that were needed for the parameter 
estimation of the spot rate process. The JP Morgan credit default swap dataset is 
                                                 
10 The bid-ask prices are consensus quotes among market participants regarding the value of the CDS. 
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 comprised of quotes for contracts of maturities 3 through 10 years. During the 
sample period there are 135 weeks of default swap quotes per reference entity.  
 In reality since most of the credit default swaps trading activity is within the 
5-year time to maturity group, the price quotes on the 5 year CDS premia will be 
used in the study’s pricing analyses. For an issuer to be included in the sample, it 
must have at least 130 weekly observations of its 5-year CDS data points. As a result 
of this selection technique, the CDS dataset used in this study covers 41 issuers with 
an average of 133 weekly observations per issuers, for maturities of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 
years respectively.  
 As stated earlier the market liquidity will be derived from bid-ask spreads. In 
any market that is in equilibrium, there will generally be a difference between the 
best quoted ask price and the best quote bid price. That difference is called the bid-
ask spread (or bid-offer spread). For the market liquidity proxy, this study uses the 
percentage bid-ask spread, which is the bid-ask premia divided by the mid price. 
Tang and Yan (2006) suggest that bid-ask spreads measure trading costs that 
compensate market makers for the risk of adverse selection and hedging costs. 
Depending upon the market bid-ask quotes may be expressed as actual prices, yields, 
implied volatilities, etc. The average of the bid and ask prices is called the mid-offer 
price. 
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     4. Discussion of the Empirical Results 
Estimates of the term structure parameters of iPθ , ipκ and iσ  for the spot 
interest rate, market observed credit default swap (CDS) prices and the bid-ask 
liquidity proxy were computed using cross-sectional data of 1-year, 3-year, 5-year, 
7-year and the 10-year credit default observations. The sample variance, mean 
reversion parameter and long term mean is computed using the smoothed forward 
rate curves previously generated over the sample period. The parameter estimates 
and the standard errors are presented in table 1a below; 
 
   Table 1a: Term Structure Coefficients for spot rate 
Parameter Coefficient Std Error 
к 0.1400 0.0237 
θ 2.2900 0.01737 
σr 0.0200 0.00037 
 
To estimate the study’s three-factor reduced form model the term structure estimates 
for the liquidity process’ volatility, long-term mean and reversion factor were 
computed from the smoothed CDS bid-ask liquidity forward curve. The estimates 
and standard error are presented below in table 1b; 
 
          Table 1b: Term Structure Coefficients for Liquidity variable 
 Parameter Coefficient Std Error 
к 0.1420 0.0295 
θ 6.7632 3.195 
σr 0.2318 0.029 
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 Looking at the sample’s bid ask quotes, it is apparent that the average bid-ask 
spread increases with deterioration in credit rating. High bid-ask spreads are 
associated with low liquidity, hence firms perceived to be of a lower risk of default 
have lower instantaneous bid-ask credit spreads than firms in the high default risk 
group. Table 2 presents the pooled bid-ask spreads by credit ratings. 
 
Table 2: Pooled 5 Yr CDS Bid-Ask Spreads 
Tranche  
Rating 
5 Yr 
AAA 3.13 
AA 4.68 
A 5.15 
BBB 7.21 
BB 9.27 
B 8.34 
 
Table 3 summarizes characteristics of the sample’s default swap quotes. The 
table shows the average CDS quotes by industry and credit rating over the 
observation period for each of the listed referenced entities. Table 3 also shows that 
the average cross-sectional spread for each entity increases with the maturity of the 
swap.  
Table 4a and 4b, which present the sample’s descriptive statistics, both 
illustrate that the mean spread increases as credit quality deteriorated for the 5yr 
CDS spread. Also, the mean spreads were found to be higher at longer maturities. 
This is important because anecdotal evidence suggests that credit rating is an 
important determinant of default premiums, and as Houweling et al (2005) suggests, 
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 “average premiums move linearly with credit quality”, hence average premium 
appears to increase with a decrease in credit quality.  The pooled means, standard 
deviations and coefficient of variations presented in table 4a further illustrate the 
degree of variability underlying the sample data. The estimates indicate variability 
both within and across credit qualities. Trứck et al (2004) suggests that this 
variability stems from the speed of reaction of the various financial markets to credit 
quality changes. The CDS market is perceived to react much quicker to anticipated 
credit quality changes than the bond or stock markets, see Hull et al (2004) and 
Longstaff et al (2005).  
 
4.1 Results of the Two-Factor Model 
 
Table 5 presents the non-linear regression results of the average default swap 
parameters over the sample period, measured in basis points. The average 
autonomous parameter estimates for λ0 ranged from a low of 0.6347 for Cendant 
Corp to a high of 1110.37 for AMR Corp, whilst the λ1 estimate ranged from a low 
of 0.8546 for Arrow Electronics to a high of 245.37 for AMR Corp of Texas. All 
parameters were found to be statistically different from zero, and with R2 values 
above 90%. Since the study used estimated hazard functions derived from the credit 
default swap premia, it is believed that this will give a fairly good representation of 
the default and credit risk relationship. From the analysis, and consistent with Jarrow 
et al’s (2001) findings, λ1 is positive indicating that as interest rates increase, the 
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 likelihood of default also increases, an observation that conforms to economic 
principles. The autonomous credit risk component was also found to be positive 
which indicates that when interest rates are zero there is a fractional amount of credit 
spread unaffected by the spot rate.  
 The hazard rate functions of all 32 firms had root mean errors (RMSE) of less 
than 0 basis points, with exception of AMR and UNUM Provident. These fitting 
errors compare well since the root mean square error, a kind of generalized standard 
deviation, which measures differences between subgroups or relationships between 
variables is close to or less than zero. These small errors are evidence that the CDS 
valuation model is relatively successful in capturing both the level and variation in 
default and credit risks.  
 Using these estimated parameter values for the hazard function the study then 
used the closed form expression in equation 6 to solve for the credit default premia. 
Summary statistics for the difference between the implied and the market credit 
default swap premia are reported in Table 6. These summary statistics include the 
average differences with their respective t-statistics and the mean absolute 
percentage pricing error (the average of the absolute spread error divided by the 
observed swap premia). From Table 6 the pricing errors range from being positive to 
slightly negative for the study’s reference entities indicating that on average the 
model does a good job of pricing the CDS premia observed in the market. The t-
statistics show that approximately 90 percent of the average differences of the 
sample are statistically significant. 
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  Although, the average differences are generally all positive (except Altria 
Group, Alcan, Cendant, Dow Chemical, WAMU, Viacom, AMR, Nordstrom, 
Marriot and XL Capital), there is significant cross-sectional variation in the average 
differences across credit rating. For example in the AAA category, the average 
absolute differences range from low values of 0.17 basis points for GE to 1.00 basis 
points for XL Capital and in the A category a low of 0.08 basis points for ACE Ltd 
to 21.2 basis points for Viacom Corp, respectively. The cross-sectional mean and 
standard deviation of the average differences are 114.96 and 12.54 basis points 
respectively. This appears consistent with Duffie (1999) who suggests that reduce 
form models have difficulty explaining the observed term structure of credit spreads 
across firms of different qualities. In particular, such models have difficulty 
generating both relatively flat yield spreads when firms have low credit risk and 
steeper yield spreads when firms have higher credit risk. It is believed that this 
shortcoming can be overcome by extending the 2-parameter hazard function model 
to incorporate a parameter that measures market liquidity of the corporate credit 
market, since it is believed that the level of liquidity in the market place can have a 
significant effect on prices.  
 
4.2 Results of the Three-Factor Model 
 
Tables 7a and 7b present the parameter estimates for the extended reduced 
form model discussed in section 2. Bloomberg CDS bid-ask spread measured in 
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 basis points was used as a proxy of market liquidity. Table 7a demonstrates that the 
average autonomous parameter estimate for λ0 ranged from a low of 0.584 for 
Capital One bank to a high of 1522.5 basis points for AMR. The estimates for λ1 
ranged from a low of 0.715 for Marriott Hotels to a high of 177.993 for AMR Corp, 
whilst the absolute λ2 estimate ranged from a low of 0.0245 for IBM Corp to a high 
of 44.8615 for Cendant. All estimates were statistically different from zero, and 
returned an R2 that were better than those of the two factor model and above the 90% 
level.  
Consistent with the earlier discussion of the two-factor model results, the root 
mean error of the estimates were all less than zero, and λ1 was found to be positive, 
indicating that as interest rates increase, the likelihood of default also rises. 
Additionally, the extended model also returned inverse parameter estimates for λ2, 
indicating that market liquidity moves inversely with credit risk. This result is in line 
with findings by Acharya and Johnson (2005) who also, while using a bid-ask 
liquidity proxy, found an inverse relationship between credit risk and liquidity. The 
effects of liquidity across credit quality is demonstrated in table 7b, which affirms 
the hypotheses that market liquidity does impact CDS valuation, and investors 
autonomous risks are greater than is apparent in the absence of market liquidity. 
Table 7b further illustrates that there is significant cross-sectional variation along the 
lines of credit quality, industry and liquidity. This variation could be due in part to 
one or a combination of the following observations: 
(a) The CDS market’s quick response to anticipated credit quality changes; 
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 (b) The individual CDS level of liquidity or illiquidity11.  
Table 8 presents the variance of the implied and market CDS prices, based on 
the closed form expression in equation 6. The results also include summary statistics 
such as the t-Stats and the mean absolute percentage pricing error of the differences 
between the implied and actual CDS prices. As with the earlier discussion of the 
two-factor model, the pricing errors range from positive to slightly negative. This 
finding appears to compliment a recent study by Longstaff et al (2005) who suggests 
that the market prices of credit risk may be larger than observed. The cross-sectional 
standard deviation of 3.93 suggests that although there is the significant variation 
across credit ratings, the liquidity parameter helps in explaining some of the 
observed cross-sectional variation seen in the two-factor specification. This finding 
is supported by prior work done by Tang and Yan (2006) who found that on average 
liquidity explains about 40% of the cross-sectional variation in CDS spreads. 
Further, the model’s pooled measurement error of -3.50 indicates far better 
explanatory performance of the extended model over the two-factor credit-market 
risk model, thereby highlighting the importance of market liquidity in the valuation 
model. Additional evidence of the liquidity proxy’s enhancement of the valuation 
model is further explained by the mean absolute percentage valuation error12 which 
returned 3.72 percent for the three-factor model as compared to the 8.40% of the 
two-factor model.  
                                                 
11 The CDS level of liquidity or illiquidity11; Chen et al (2004) suggests that the liquidity effect in Bond spreads 
remains significant even after controlling for several yield spread factors such as credit ratings, maturity and tax 
effects. 
12 This is the average of the absolute valuation error divided by the mean observed CDS price. 
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 Finally, the superior performance of the three-factor model versus the two-
factor model bolsters the hypothesis that market liquidity influences the valuation of 
credit default swaps. This is consistent with results obtained by Chen et al (2004) in 
their work in examining the importance of liquidity in corporate yield spreads. In 
addition, the study also illustrates that implied autonomous credit risk is larger than 
investors would be led to believe in the absence of a market liquidity measure. The 
two factor model did not fully quantify the value of implied autonomous credit risk. 
However once liquidity was added to the model we saw that investors had more 
implied exposure than previously perceived. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Over the past few years, financial markets have been marked by increased 
volatility and risk, due in part to the decline of credit quality brought on by 
unfavorable economic shocks. As a result of this scenario, there has been a sharp rise 
in the use of credit default swaps by investors to reduce credit and market risks. 
Given the growing importance of the CDS market in both widening and deepening 
credit markets, this study attempts to investigate the importance of liquidity in the 
valuation process of CDS. A liquidity proxy was introduced to a popular two-factor 
approach to see its effects on the valuation process.  
Both models were implemented empirically and the study found clear 
evidence that (a) The inclusion of liquidity improved the CDS valuation 
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 methodology, (b) The implied cost of autonomous credit risk is significantly higher 
with the inclusion of a liquidity proxy. The absence of market liquidity 
underestimates implied autonomous credit risk. The inclusion of the liquidity 
measure indicated that investors’ implied risk was greater because of liquidity’s 
effect through credit quality. The analysis also confirmed that the inclusion of the 
liquidity parameter did improve the valuation methodology. This was demonstrated 
through comparisons of the implied premia results of both models, the extended 
three-factor model performed better in matching the observed market data, 
suggesting that the addition of the market liquidity variable improved the 
explanatory power of the model.  
Economic theory suggests that market and credit risk are related to each other 
and not separable. The study found that market liquidity is important in valuing 
credit default swaps because it affects credit risks indirectly through credit quality. 
The results of both models in the study have affirmed this view. The empirical 
results also illustrated levels of cross-sectional variation across both the high grade 
and yield credit grades. These levels of cross-sectional variation increase in the 
absence of a liquidity measure.  
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Issuer Ticker Industry S&P Moodys 1Year 3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year
General Electric GE Industrial AAA Aaa 9 18 27 33 41
Verizon VZ Telecom A A3 11 27 39 47 58
Altria MO Consumer BBB+ Baa2 48 73 93 108 126
Aetna AET HealthCare A- A3 25 29 33 48 55
Ace Insurance ACE Insurance A- A3 18 35 52 57 63
Alcan AL Mining BBB+ Baa1 14 24 34 37 43
Alcoa AA Mining A- A2 11 20 29 36 44
Alltell AT Telecom A- A2 11 28 40 47 57
American Express AXP Credit Services A+ A1 7 17 25 31 37
American International Group AIG Insurance AA Aa2 10 16 22 28 34
Arrow Electronics ARW Electronics/wholesale BBB- Baa3 42 70 95 117 130
Bristol-Myers-Squibb BMY Drug Manufacturer A+ A1 9 20 31 37 44
Cendant CD Rental and Leasing BBB+ Baa1 19 34 49 58 69
Caterpillar CAT Industrial A A2 11 18 25 32 38
Cingular AT&T Telecom A Baa1 18 29 40 48 58
Capital One COF Credit Services BBB A3 26 40 54 62 70
IBM IBM Computer A+ A1 11 16 21 26 32
Wal-Mart WMT Consumer/Discount AA Aa2 9 11 15 20 25
Target TGT Consumer/Discount A+ A2 13 17 22 28 37
Dow Chemical DOW Chemical A- A3 16 28 38 46 54
Washinton Mutual Bank WAMU Bank A A2 14 27 40 45 54
Viacom VIA Cable A Baa3 13 27 41 51 63
Carnival Corporation CCL Entertainment A- A3 17 31 45 53 64
American Airlines AMR Airline B Caa2 2157 2079 2001 1,836 1701
Lucent LU Manufacturing B B1 152 215 278 297 314
Starwood Resorts HOT Lodging BB+ Ba2 88 113 138 152 159
UNUM Provident Group Insurance/Benefit BB+ Ba1 157 187 217 227 240
KB Homes KBH Residential Construction BB Ba1 117 150 183 188 193
Nordstrom JWN Consumer/apparel A Baa1 14 24 34 43 54
Halliburton HAL Oil and Gas BBB+ Baa1 36 45 54 65 73
Marriott MAR Lodging BBB+ Baa2 16 29 42 51 60
XL Capital XL Insurance AAA A3 22 34 46 50 57
Table 3: Summary Statistics showing the average 1 through 10 year spreads of the listed reference entities and their credit ratings used in the study.
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Table 4a: Pooled Sample Mean Std Dev and Coefficient of Variation
Mean Std Dev σ/µ
36.50 5.47 0.15
18.50 4.06 0.22
35.06 9.16 0.26
59.86 14.10 0.25
179.33 46.22 0.26
1139.50 205.63 0.22
BB
B
Credit Rating
AAA
AA
A
BBB
 
Issuer Ticker Industry S&P Moodys Tenor Mean Min Max Std Dev σ/µ N
General Electric Capital GE Finance AAA Aaa 5 Yr 27 19.00 36.00 4.40 0.1629 321
Verizon VZ Telecom A A3 5 Yr 39 19.00 60.00 10.94 0.2805 321
Altria MO Consumer BBB+ Baa2 5 Yr 105 77.00 125.00 16.45 0.1567 321
Aetna AET HealthCare A- A3 5 Yr 39 25.00 42.00 10.63 0.2726 321
Ace Insurance ACE Insurance A- A3 5 Yr 52 33.00 115.00 12.16 0.2339 321
Alcan AL Mining BBB+ Baa1 5 Yr 34 20.00 58.00 10.63 0.3127 321
Alcoa AA Mining A- A2 5 Yr 29 15.00 46.00 8.11 0.2797 321
Alltell AT Telecom A- A2 5 Yr 40 20.00 59.00 12.89 0.3222 321
American Express AXP Credit Services A+ A1 5 Yr 25.00 18.00 31.00 4.73 0.1892 321
American International Group AIG Insurance AA Aa2 5 Yr 22 17.00 52.00 4.77 0.2166 321
Arrow Electronics ARW Technology/Computer BBB- Baa3 5 Yr 95 64.00 133.00 23.54 0.2478 321
Bristol-Myers-Squibb BMY Drug Manufacturer A+ A1 5 Yr 31 15.00 50.00 9.87 0.3184 321
Cendant CD Rental and Leasing BBB+ Baa1 5 Yr 35 38.00 61.00 5.66 0.1618 321
Caterpillar CAT Industrial A A2 5 Yr 25 18.00 30.00 3.87 0.1549 321
Cingular AT&T Telecom A Baa1 5 Yr 40 21.00 70.00 14.44 0.3611 321
Capital One COF Credit Services BBB A3 5 Yr 54 30.00 75.00 11.33 0.2097 321
IBM IBM Computer A+ A1 5 Yr 21.00 10.00 31.00 4.90 0.2335 321
Wal-Mart WMT Retail - Non Food AA Aa2 5 Yr 15 8.00 20.00 3.35 0.2232 321
Target TGT Retail - Non Food A+ A2 5 Yr 22 10.00 32.00 6.68 0.3035 321
Dow Chemical DOW Chemical A- A3 5 Yr 38 17.00 56.00 11.74 0.3090 321
Washinton Mutual Bank WAMU Bank A A2 5 Yr 40 32.00 53.00 4.19 0.1046 321
Viacom VIA Cable/Media A Baa3 5 Yr 41 22.00 62.00 10.97 0.2676 321
Carnival Corporation CCL Entertainment A- A3 5 Yr 45 25.00 70.00 14.30 0.3177 321
American Airlines AMR Airline B Caa2 5 Yr 2001 1489.00 2837.00 336.39 0.1681 321
Lucent LU Manufacturing B B1 5 Yr 278 130.00 430.00 74.87 0.2693 321
Starwood Resorts HOT Hotels BB+ Ba2 5 Yr 138 80.00 205.00 40.46 0.2932 321
UNUM Provident Group Insurance/Benefit BB+ Ba1 5 Yr 217 101.70 370.60 53.99 0.2488 321
KB Homes KBH Residential Construction BB Ba1 5 Yr 183 90.00 260.00 44.22 0.2416 321
Nordstrom JWN Retail - Non Food A Baa1 5 Yr 34 22.00 70.00 6.20 0.1824 321
Halliburton HAL Oil and Gas BBB+ Baa1 5 Yr 54 29.00 88.00 19.57 0.3624 321
Marriott MAR Hotels BBB+ Baa2 5 Yr 42 25.00 56.00 11.51 0.2740 321
XL Capital XL Insurance AAA A3 5 Yr 46 34.00 75.00 6.54 0.1421 321
Table 4b: Descriptive Statistics of Credit Default Spread. The table presents summary statistics for credit default swap premia for the indicated firms making up the study. The spreads are expressed 
in basis points. N denotes the number of observations, and the remainder of the data includes the individual mean spread, standard deviation, min and max spreads.
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Issuer Ticker Industry S&P Moodys λ0 Std Error λ1 Std Error SSE MSE N
General Electric GE Industrial AAA Aaa 1.1511 0.1915 6.9521 0.0524 12.9740 0.0796 331
Verizon VZ Telecom A A3 29.4445 0.0572 2.8060 0.0156 1.1578 0.0071 331
Altria MO Consumer BBB+ Baa2 54.6608 0.3645 17.3340 0.1073 190.3000 0.7582 331
Aetna AET HealthCare A- A3 7.6348 0.1000 6.8644 0.0294 14.3324 0.0571 331
Ace Insurance ACE Insurance A- A3 3.8551 0.1265 13.4868 0.0372 22.9113 0.0913 331
Alcan AL Mining BBB+ Baa1 19.3460 0.1013 3.7594 0.0277 3.6294 0.0223 331
Alcoa AA Mining A- A2 16.4528 0.0891 3.0594 0.0244 2.8102 0.0172 331
Alltell AT Telecom A- A2 33.2267 0.0565 2.6432 0.0155 1.1292 0.0069 331
American Express AXP Credit Services A+ A1 12.9567 0.0797 3.8295 0.0218 2.2455 0.0138 331
American International Group AIG Insurance AA Aa2 13.5958 0.0299 5.1498 0.0163 0.0792 0.0005 331
Arrow Electronics ARW Electronics/wholesale BBB- Baa3 2.9443 0.8546 0.8546 0.2337 258.2000 1.5844 331
Bristol-Myers-Squibb BMY Drug Manufacturer A+ A1 4.2996 0.1931 6.4785 0.0528 13.1914 0.0809 331
Cendant CD Rental and Leasing BBB+ Baa1 0.6347 0.1399 28.9499 0.0765 1.7368 0.0107 331
Caterpillar CAT Industrial A A2 15.1797 0.1210 3.3605 0.0331 5.1804 0.0318 331
Cingular AT&T Telecom A Baa1 2.6585 0.1896 9.4926 0.0518 12.7102 0.0780 331
Capital One COF Credit Services BBB A3 36.7961 0.0665 5.9882 0.0182 1.5628 0.0096 331
IBM IBM Computer A+ A1 17.2451 0.0148 1.0652 0.0041 0.0778 0.0005 331
Wal-Mart WMT Consumer/Discount AA Aa2 5.5751 0.0706 2.5742 0.0193 1.7619 0.0108 331
Target TGT Consumer/Discount A+ A2 8.0629 0.1936 5.4309 0.0529 13.2532 0.0813 331
Dow Chemical DOW Chemical A- A3 8.5963 0.1921 7.0758 0.0525 13.0521 0.0801 331
Washinton Mutual Bank WAMU Bank A A2 35.9184 0.0399 1.3590 0.0109 0.5637 0.0035 331
Viacom VIA Cable A Baa3 19.3129 0.0606 9.0132 0.0332 0.3263 0.0020 331
Carnival Corporation CCL Entertainment A- A3 3.2065 0.1315 9.9833 0.0360 6.1181 0.0375 331
American Airlines AMR Airline B Caa2 1110.3720 7.4311 245.3688 2.0318 19527.2000 119.8000 331
Lucent LU Manufacturing B B1 141.3093 1.1879 35.9131 0.3248 499.0000 3.0611 331
Starwood Resorts HOT Lodging BB+ Ba2 88.8308 0.5698 13.6759 0.1558 114.8000 0.7043 331
UNUM Provident Group Insurance/Benefit BB+ Ba1 79.6071 1.6766 46.5657 0.4584 994.0000 6.0982 331
KB Homes KBH Residential Construction BB Ba1 104.4741 0.4993 21.6705 0.1365 88.1448 0.5408 331
Nordstrom JWN Consumer/apparel A Baa1 20.2062 0.0874 4.0098 0.0239 2.6988 0.0166 331
Halliburton HAL Oil and Gas BBB+ Baa1 6.3966 0.2910 13.1521 0.0796 29.9462 0.1837 331
Marriott MAR Lodging BBB+ Baa2 39.0514 0.0184 0.8862 0.0050 0.1195 0.0007 331
XL Capital XL Insurance AAA A3 31.2332 0.1077 4.6646 0.0294 4.1006 0.0252 331
Table 5: Parameter Estimates of the Two Factor model - This table presents the parameter estimates and summary statistics from fitting the default parameter model to the CDS data of the indicated 
reference entities.
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Issuer Ticker Industry S&P Moodys Implied Spread Avg Diff Mean Abs % Valuation Error t-Stat
General Electric GE Industrial AAA Aaa 20.17 0.17 0.64 0.71
Verizon VZ Telecom A A3 37.12 7.12 18.26 11.70
Altria MO Consumer BBB+ Baa2 99.93 19.93 21.43 21.77
Aetna AET HealthCare A- A3 25.56 0.56 1.71 0.95
Ace Ltd ACE Insurance A- A3 39.08 0.08 0.15 0.12
Alcan AL Mining BBB+ Baa1 29.63 -4.37 12.87 7.39
Alcoa AA Mining A- A2 30.21 4.21 14.51 9.32
Alltell AT Telecom A- A2 40.46 0.46 1.15 0.64
American Express AXP Credit Services A+ A1 23.43 0.43 1.74 1.65
American International Group AIG Insurance AA Aa2 24.73 0.73 3.31 2.75
Arrow Electronics ARW Electronics/wholesale BBB- Baa3 80.21 14.21 14.95 10.85
Bristol-Myers-Squibb BMY Drug Manufacturer A+ A1 22.03 2.03 6.53 3.69
Cendant CD Rental and Leasing BBB+ Baa1 63.22 -11.78 24.04 37.38
Caterpillar CAT Industrial A A2 24.37 1.37 5.50 6.38
Cingular AT&T Telecom A Baa1 28.63 5.63 14.08 7.01
Capital One COF Credit Services BBB A3 53.19 22.19 41.10 35.22
IBM IBM Computer A+ A1 20.16 1.16 5.52 4.25
Wal-Mart WMT Consumer/Discount AA Aa2 12.62 0.62 4.12 3.32
Target TGT Consumer/Discount A+ A2 22.92 4.92 22.38 13.25
Dow Chemical DOW Chemical A- A3 27.96 -0.04 0.11 0.07
Washinton Mutual Bank WAMU Bank A A2 39.64 -0.36 0.91 1.56
Viacom VIA Cable A Baa3 38.80 -21.20 51.71 34.73
Carnival Corporation CCL Entertainment A- A3 30.52 2.52 5.60 3.17
American Airlines AMR Airline B Caa2 1781.73 -0.27 0.01 0.01
Lucent LU Manufacturing B B1 239.57 0.57 0.21 0.14
Starwood Resorts HOT Lodging BB+ Ba2 126.25 0.25 0.18 0.11
UNUM Provident Insurance/Benefit BB+ Ba1 207.02 58.02 26.74 19.31
KB Homes KBH Residential Construction BB Ba1 163.77 1.77 0.97 0.72
Nordstrom JWN Consumer/apparel A Baa1 31.18 -2.82 8.30 8.18
Halliburton HAL Oil and Gas BBB+ Baa1 42.38 8.38 15.52 7.70
Marriott MAR Lodging BBB+ Baa2 41.48 -0.52 1.25 0.82
XL Capital XL Insurance AAA A3 44.00 -1.00 2.18 2.76
114.96 8.40%
Table 6: Two-Factor model Summary Statistics for the difference between simulated and observed CDS premia - Avg Diff is the difference of the simulated over the 
actual observed spread.
Total Average Diff and Mean Abs % Valuation Error
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Issuer Ticker Industry S&P Moodys λ0 Std Error λ1 Std Error λ2 Std Error SSE MSE N
General Electric GE Industrial AAA Aaa 11.9351 0.8917 5.1890 0.1482 -0.8224 0.0672 17.9730 0.0548 331
Verizon VZ Telecom A A3 33.1737 0.2451 2.1959 0.0407 -0.2841 0.0185 1.3581 0.0041 331
Altria MO Consumer BBB+ Baa2 15.7214 3.7698 29.6891 0.6266 -3.6600 0.2840 321.2000 0.9793 331
Aetna AET HealthCare A- A3 14.9797 0.6031 5.6324 0.1024 -0.5340 0.0435 21.9207 0.0436 331
Ace Ltd ACE Insurance A- A3 14.7832 0.7189 11.6530 0.1221 -0.7941 0.0519 31.1400 0.0619 331
Alcan AL Mining BBB+ Baa1 24.3375 0.4954 2.9436 0.0823 -0.3809 0.0373 5.5469 0.0169 331
Alcoa AA Mining A- A2 21.4711 0.4143 2.2389 0.0689 -0.3827 0.0312 3.8789 0.0118 331
Alltell AT Telecom A- A2 36.6100 0.2537 2.0898 0.0422 -0.2578 0.0191 1.4552 0.0044 331
American Express AXP Credit Services A+ A1 17.3110 0.3751 3.1179 0.0623 -0.3322 0.0283 3.1795 0.0097 331
American International Group AIG Insurance AA Aa2 52.6673 3.2630 2.7820 0.1977 -3.1421 0.2624 0.1084 0.0003 331
Arrow Electronics ARW Electronics/wholesale BBB- Baa3 12.6063 3.7102 28.7950 0.6167 -3.6243 0.2795 311.1000 0.9486 331
Bristol-Myers-Squibb BMY Drug Manufacturer A+ A1 14.7461 0.9139 4.7707 0.1519 -0.7967 0.0688 18.8769 0.0576 331
Cendant CD Rental and Leasing BBB+ Baa1 512.7843 74.7083 21.7088 4.5273 -44.8615 6.0088 56.8358 0.1733 331
Caterpillar CAT Industrial A A2 21.7051 0.5750 2.2937 0.0956 -0.4978 0.0433 7.4736 0.0228 331
Cingular AT&T Telecom A Baa1 0.7384 0.7989 10.5624 0.1328 -0.8844 0.0602 14.4271 0.0440 331
Capital One COF Credit Services BBB A3 0.5837 2.0208 15.8081 0.3359 -1.9719 0.1522 92.2950 0.2814 331
IBM IBM Computer A+ A1 17.5643 0.0800 1.0132 0.0133 -0.0245 0.0060 0.1448 0.0210 331
Wal-Mart WMT Consumer/Discount AA Aa2 9.4754 0.3319 1.9368 0.0552 -0.2977 0.0250 2.4899 0.0076 331
Target TGT Consumer/Discount A+ A2 18.0885 0.9343 3.7924 0.1553 -0.7649 0.0704 19.7307 0.0602 331
Dow Chemical DOW Chemical A- A3 19.4319 0.8934 5.3041 0.1485 -0.8263 0.0673 18.0403 0.0550 331
Washinton Mutual Bank WAMU Bank A A2 37.8494 0.1984 1.0441 0.0330 -0.1466 0.0149 0.8895 0.0027 331
Viacom VIA Cable A Baa3 316.2048 27.5793 28.1641 1.6713 -29.2996 2.2182 7.7455 0.0236 331
Carnival Corporation CCL Entertainment A- A3 12.4239 0.5326 8.4745 0.0885 -0.7016 0.0401 6.4117 0.0195 331
American Airlines AMR Airline B Caa2 1522.5250 34.8332 177.9932 5.7900 -31.4364 2.6242 27424.0000 83.6099 331
Lucent LU Manufacturing B B1 206.0509 5.6091 25.3306 0.9324 -4.9388 0.4226 711.1000 2.1680 331
Starwood Resorts HOT Lodging BB+ Ba2 121.3780 2.6399 8.3553 0.4388 -2.4825 0.1989 157.5000 0.4802 331
UNUM Provident Insurance/Benefit BB+ Ba1 36.9341 7.9075 61.8381 1.3144 -7.7142 0.5957 1413.3000 4.3088 331
KB Homes KBH Residential Construction BB Ba1 135.7713 2.1931 16.5511 0.3645 -2.3848 0.1652 108.7000 0.3314 331
Nordstrom JWN Consumer/apparel A Baa1 24.3880 0.4247 3.3266 0.0706 -0.3191 0.0320 4.0771 0.0124 331
Halliburton HAL Oil and Gas BBB+ Baa1 23.4243 1.3300 10.3678 0.2211 -1.2982 0.1002 39.9807 0.1219 331
Marriott MAR Lodging BBB+ Baa2 40.0984 0.0857 0.7150 0.0142 -0.0798 0.0065 0.1658 0.0005 331
XL Capital XL Insurance AAA A3 37.4781 0.4947 3.6435 0.0822 -0.4762 0.0373 5.5314 0.0169 331
Table 7a: Parameter Estimates of the Three Factor model - Presented are the hazard function's parameter results for the study's reference entities
 
Two Factor Model
λ0 λ1 λ0 λ1 λ2
16.19 5.81 24.71 4.42 -0.65
9.59 3.86 31.07 2.36 -1.72
14.89 5.62 38.84 5.98 -2.30
17.53 8.93 89.94 15.72 -7.98
90.97 27.30 98.03 28.91 -4.19
625.84 140.64 864.29 101.66 -18.19
Table 7b: Pooled average parameter estimates across credit classes for 2 and 3 factor models
AAA
B
AA
A
BBB
BBBB
B
AAA
AA
A
BBB
Credit Rating
Three Facto Model
Credit Rating
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Issuer Ticker Industry S&P Moodys Implied Spread Avg Diff Mean Abs % Valuation Error t-Stat
General Electric GE Industrial AAA Aaa 20.05 0.05 0.18 0.20
Verizon VZ Telecom A A3 37.08 7.08 18.16 11.63
Altria MO Consumer BBB+ Baa2 63.85 -16.15 17.36 17.64
Aetna AET HealthCare A- A3 25.67 0.67 2.03 1.14
Ace Insurance ACE Insurance A- A3 39.24 0.24 0.47 0.36
Alcan AL Mining BBB+ Baa1 29.57 -4.43 13.02 7.48
Alcoa AA Mining A- A2 24.77 -1.23 4.25 2.73
Alltell AT Telecom A- A2 40.42 0.42 1.05 0.59
American Express AXP Credit Services A+ A1 23.38 0.38 1.54 1.46
American International Group AIG Insurance AA Aa2 24.72 0.72 3.28 2.72
Arrow Electronics ARW Electronics/wholesale BBB- Baa3 64.59 -1.41 1.49 1.08
Bristol-Myers-Squibb BMY Drug Manufacturer A+ A1 21.91 1.91 6.15 3.47
Cendant CD Rental and Leasing BBB+ Baa1 74.85 -0.15 0.30 0.47
Caterpillar CAT Industrial A A2 24.30 1.30 5.20 6.03
Cingular AT&T Telecom A Baa1 23.10 0.10 0.24 0.12
Capital One COF Credit Services BBB A3 29.25 -1.75 3.24 2.78
IBM IBM Computer A+ A1 20.16 1.16 5.50 4.23
Wal-Mart WMT Consumer/Discount AA Aa2 12.57 0.57 3.82 3.08
Target TGT Consumer/Discount A+ A2 22.81 4.81 21.85 12.94
Dow Chemical DOW Chemical A- A3 27.83 -0.17 0.44 0.26
Washinton Mutual Bank WAMU Bank A A2 39.62 -0.38 0.96 1.65
Viacom VIA Cable A Baa3 60.42 0.42 1.03 0.69
Carnival Corporation CCL Entertainment A- A3 30.42 2.42 5.38 3.04
American Airlines AMR Airline B Caa2 1777.01 -4.99 0.25 0.27
Lucent LU Manufacturing B B1 238.83 -0.17 0.06 0.04
Starwood Resorts HOT Lodging BB+ Ba2 125.88 -0.12 0.09 0.05
UNUM Provident Group Insurance/Benefit BB+ Ba1 149.07 0.07 0.03 0.02
KB Homes KBH Residential Construction BB Ba1 163.42 1.42 0.77 0.58
Nordstrom JWN Consumer/apparel A Baa1 31.13 -2.87 8.44 8.32
Halliburton HAL Oil and Gas BBB+ Baa1 42.19 8.19 15.17 7.52
Marriott MAR Lodging BBB+ Baa2 41.46 -0.54 1.27 0.84
XL Capital XL Insurance AAA A3 43.93 -1.07 2.34 2.95
-3.50 3.72%
Table 8: Three-Factor model Summary Statistics for the difference between simulated and observed CDS premia - Avg Diff is the difference of the simulated over the actual 
observed spread.
Total Average Diff and Mean Abs % Valuation Error
 
               
 
